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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No.

90087-CA

JOSEPH MICHAEL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF

The following Reply Brief is offered to the arguments made by
the State in its Brief filed October 15, 1990.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LACK JURISDICTION
TO ENTERTAIN DEFENDANTS MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS NO CONTEST PLEA IN THAT HE WAS NOT
GOVERNED BY THE 1990 AMENDMENT TO SECTION
77-13-6, U.C.A.
The chronology of this case is simple.

On July 20, 1987

Defendant entered his no contest plea to the charge of attempted
sexual abuse of a child.

At that time Section 77-13-6, U.C.A.

read as follows:
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of not guilty may
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. A plea of
guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of court.
As noted by the State, "Under the original version of the statute,
Defendant's ability to remedy his plea by filing such a motion
began at the time of his plea and continued ad infinitum."
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(Appellee's Brief, p. 9).
In 1989 the guilty plea statute was amended as follows:
A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest is made by motion, and shall be made within
thirty days after the entry of the plea.
Defendant filed his motion to withdraw his no contest plea on
September 18, 1989.

Thus, the State now argues that the amended

statute is applicable and since Defendant did not file his motion
within thirty days of his guilty plea there is no jurisdiction.
The argument raised by the State borders on the frivolous.
At the time the amended statute was passed almost twenty months
had elapsed since the time Defendant entered his plea.

Even if

Defendant had been aware of the new amendment to the statute,
which he was not, he would still have been precluded from filing
his motion since he did not do so within thirty days after the
entry of his plea.

Basically, the State is arguing that Defendant

should be punished because he did not file his motion within
thirty days after his plea was entered even though at the time and
for almost two years later this was not required.

Thus, according

to the State, any person who entered a plea prior to February of
1989 is forever precluded from attacking such plea since that
person did not have the foresight to make the attack within thirty
days after the plea was entered relying instead upon the existing
law that had been on the books for decades.
Aside from the obvious injustice that the State's argument
would produce to those persons who entered pleas prior to the 1989
amendment, there is sound legal reasoning why the argument must
fail.

The Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of Smith v. Cook,
-2-

149 Utah Adv.

Rep.

3 (Utah, Nov.

29, 1990) addressed an

argument in which a probation statute was amended subsequent to a
defendant's conviction restricting the number of months that
probation could be utilized.
Annotated §68-3-3 (Supp.

The court first noted that Utah Code

1984) provides that "no part of these

Revised Statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." As
in the Cook case, the present amendment to Section 77-13-6 does
not declare itself retroactive.
The Supreme Court noted the exception to the rule as to
statutes that are "procedural or remedial" in nature.

The Court

stated, "a statute is considered procedural or remedial, as
opposed to substantive, if the statute does not enlarge,
eliminate, or destroy vested rights." Id. at 4.

The court

noted in the Cook case that since the newly amended statute
limits the time a person can be placed on probation it therefore
enlarges the rights of an individual who is placed on probation
and therefore the amendment is substantive and cannot be applied
retroactively.
The same reasoning is equally applicable here.

Rather than

enlarging the rights of an individual who enters a plea, the
present statute substantially reduces it.

Whereas before such

person could bring his motion for relief at any time after the
plea was entered the new statute now restricts such right to
within a thirty-day period.

Thus, the amendment is substantive

and is not procedural as claimed by the State.

(Appellee's Brief,

pp. 8-9) .
In addition, the argument advanced by the State would
-3-

preclude the defendant from legal redress from an erroneous no
contest plea.

The application urged by the State would violate

Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution commonly known as
the open court provision.

The Utah Supreme Court in Berry v.

Beach Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and Horton v.
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) struck down
statutes of repose on the basis that an injured person who was
injured six years after the date of purchase of a product as in
Berry or who was injured seven years after the construction of
a building as in Horton could not bring a suit against the tort
feasors even though their causes of action had not even arisen in
which they could have taken any action.

The Utah Supreme Court

held that such statutes prevent an injured party from redress
automatically based upon an arbitrary legislative time period and
that there was no justification for allowing a person to sue a
product's manufacturer because that person was injured five years
after the purchase while denying that right to an identical
plaintiff who was injured six years after the purchase.
This same principle applies in the instant case.

Once thirty

days had elapsed from Defendant's time of his plea he was,
according to the State, forever barred from attacking the plea.
Defendant, of course, did not know this until some two years later
when the amendment was made.

This is no different than a person

who possesses a product for six years without injury only to be
injured in the seventh year.

There is no reason logically nor

constitutionally to deny these individuals redress in the court
system.
-4-
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The Supreme Court noted the exception to the rule as to
statutes that are "procedural or remedial" in nature.

The Court

stated, "a statute is considered procedural or remedial, as
opposed to substantive, if the statute does not enlarge,
eliminate, or destroy vested rights." Id. at 4.

The court

noted in the Cook case that since the newly amended statute
limits the time a person can be placed on probation it therefore
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and therefore the amendment is substantive and cannot be applied
retroactively.
The same reasoning is equally applicable here.

Rather than

enlarging the rights of an individual who enters a plea, the
present statute substantially reduces it.

Whereas before such

person could bring his motion for relief at any time after the
plea was entered the new statute now restricts such right to
within a thirty-day period.

Thus, the amendment is substantive

and is not procedural as claimed by the State.

(Appellee's Brief,

pp. 8-9).
In addition, the argument advanced by the State would
preclude the defendant from legal redress from an erroneous no
contest plea.

The application urged by the State would violate

Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution commonly known as
the open court provision.

The Utah Supreme Court in Berry v.

Beach Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and Horton v.
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) struck down
statutes of repose on the basis that an injured person who was
injured six years after the date of purchase of a product as in
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Berry or who was injured seven years after the construction of
a building as in Horton could not bring a suit against the tort
feasors even though their causes of action had not even arisen in
which they could have taken any action.

The Utah Supreme Court

held that such statutes prevent an injured party from redress
automatically based upon an arbitrary legislative time period and
that there was no justification for allowing a person to sue a
product's manufacturer because that person was injured five years
after the purchase while denying that right to an identical
plaintiff who was injured six years after the purchase.
This same principle applies in the instant case.

Once thirty

days had elapsed from Defendant's time of his plea he was,
according to the State, forever barred from attacking the plea.
Defendant, of course, did not know this until some two years later
when the amendment was made.

This is no different than a person

who possesses a product for six years without injury only to be
injured in the seventh year.

There is no reason logically nor

constitutionally to deny these individuals redress in the court
system.
The argument of the State also violates equal protection.
The 1989 amendment to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifically requires that the court will not accept a
plea until it has found "that the defendant has been advised of
the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest." Furthermore, Section 6 provides:
Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits
for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest is not a ground for setting the plea aside but
-7-

may be the ground for extending the time to make a
motion under §77-13-6.
Thus, the new rule recognizes both the importance of
informing a defendant as to the time limit and also recognizes
that the time provided in §77-13-6 is not fixed in stone and may
be extended if such advice was not given.

Clearly, Defendant was

never advised of any time limit at the time of his sentence since
no time limit was in existence.

Also, he was never advised of any

time limit as to any grace period or given any opportunity to
comply with the newly enacted statute of the thirty-day
requirement.

Refusing to allow Defendant to now argue his motion

would be a clear denial of equal protection of the law as compared
with any defendant who is now being sentenced under the new
procedure.
The argument made by the State that Defendant still has a
remedy under the habeas corpus statute is equally without merit.
If Defendant had a right to bring a habeas corpus action prior to
the 1989 amendment he had a similar right after the amendment.

In

other words, the language contained in subsection 3 of the amended
statute relating to habeas corpus is meaningless rhetoric and
could have just as easily been included in the prior statute.
This Court in Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah App.

1988)

recognized that "challenge may be made to a guilty plea either
directly or collaterally." This Court noted some of the
distinctions between the two routes, such as giving the lower
court who sentenced the defendant the opportunity to correct the
sentence rather than referring the matter to a new judge in a

-8-

habeas corpus action.

In addition, if a direct appeal is not

taken by a defendant then the argument can be made in the habeas
corpus proceeding that the defendant waived any right to proceed
further.

Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d (Utah 1987).

Finally, it is interesting to note that in the Cook case in
which the appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus as now is urged
by the State, the State maintained that that action was barred by
§78-12-31.1 which purportedly requires a habeas corpus action to
be brought within three months from the time a defendant is aware
or should have been aware of the grounds to be argued.

The

Supreme Court in Cook did not specifically address the validity of
the three-month statute but instead held that defendant's
imprisonment under a statute existing prior to 1987 tolled any
time limitation.

The court noted, however, that any ambiguity

that may exist in these type of statutes should be resolved in
favor of a criminal defendant.

Id. at 4 citing Shelmidine v.

Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976); State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah
1971).

See also concurring opinion of J. Zimmerman stating that

the three-month limitation period is unconstitutional.

Id. at 7.

Thus, the State's suggestion that this matter should be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and refiled as a habeas corpus
action is not supported by statutory interpretation or case law.
Nor is it supported by equitable principles.
been incarcerated since March of 1988.

The hearing before the

lower court occurred on December 18, 1989.
Statement was filed on March 15, 1990.

Here, Defendant has

Appellant's Docketing

Had the State truly

believed that there was no jurisdiction in this case it could and
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should have filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure thereby
eliminating a substantial time period for Defendant to prepare his
brief, for the State to reply, and for argument to be heard.
There is, therefore, no legal justification nor equitable reason
to require Defendant to start over once again in another court
thereby severely prolonging his incarceration if he is entitled to
a vacation of the plea of no contest.
For these reasons, therefore, this matter is properly before
this Court and should be decided on the merits.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE DEFENDANT'S
PLEA OF NO CONTEST SINCE THE PLEA WAS
LEGALLY DEFICIENT.
Defendant believes that his analysis of the law relating to
guilty pleas is correct in light of both Rule 11 and the Gibbons
opinion by the Utah Supreme Court.
9-32).

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

Since the State has only put forth a cursory effort to

refute the defendant's factual and legal analysis, only a brief
review of the State's arguments is required.

First, the State

contends that in "determining if denial was appropriate, this
Court must consider: (1) whether defendant's no contest plea
complied with Rule 11, Utah rules of Criminal Procedure and (2)
whether the trial court met its obligation of insuring that
defendant entered a voluntary and knowing plea." (Appellee's
Brief, p. 11). This statement is inaccurate.

The purpose of

Rule 11 is to insure that a voluntary and knowing plea is entered.
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Thus, the two cannot be separated as the State has done.

More

importantly, however, the State has not addressed the question as
to whether the no contest plea in this case meets the criteria
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Gibbons.

This criteria

is over and above the recipe list provided in Rule 11. Unless it
is complied with a plea cannot be accepted.
Utah Adv.

Rep.

143 Utah Adv.

26 (Utah App., Aug.

Rep.

State v. Gentry, 141

24, 1990); State v. Pharris,

35 (Utah App., Sept.

14, 1990).

Next, the State contends that the Court properly "asked
whether Defendant understood the elements of the crime and whether
he understood that by pleading no contest, he was giving up the
right to require the State to prove the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt."

(Appellee's Brief, p. 12). The record shows

that the entire dialogue concerning the elements of the crime as
well as a synopsis of the defendant's acts between the Court and
the defendant is as follows:
THE COURT: Now, do you also understand that if you were
to go to trial on this matter, that the State would be
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all those
matters that are listed under the section called
elements in this affidavit.
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And there are some handwritten notations in
that section as to elements, as to what those elements
are. Do you understand those?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the State's obligation
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt relates to each of
those elements?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And if you plead guilty as proposed, then you
-11-

will be giving up any rights to require the State to
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yesf Your Honor.
p. 6) .

(July 20, 1987 hearing,

The statement in the affidavit which the Court was referring
to was as follows: "Attempted abuse of child under 14—attempted
to touch the genitals of a child under the age of 14 with intent
to cause sexual gratification or pain."
It is obvious that neither the dialogue of the Court nor the
affidavit specifically addressed the facts of this case. The
affidavit was a mere recitation of the law and did not give anyone
notice as to any of the circumstances concerning the alleged crime
perpetrated by the defendant.
Since the Gibbons court specifically found that a "sufficient
affidavit" should contain "a synopsis of the defendant's acts that
establish the elements of the crimes charged" and furthermore
"that the trial judge should then review the statements in the
affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant concerning
his understanding of it, and fulfil the other requirements imposed
by Rule 11 on the record before accepting the guilty plea" it is
obvious that this requirement was not met.
This Court has recently vacated two guilty pleas on the basis
that the trial court did not comply with the Gibbons requirement
of explaining the elements and facts of the crime to the defendant
while taking the plea.

In both State v. Gentry, supra, and State

v. Pharris, supra this Court held that failure to inform a
defendant of the nature and elements of the offense is fatal to a
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guilty plea conviction and that a defendant's understanding of the
elements of the crime charged and how those elements relate to the
evidence presented may not be presumed.
The factual synposis given by the county attorney does not
meet the requirement of Gibbons that an actual dialogue occur
between the court and the defendant concerning the understanding
of the elements and the evidence,

(Appellee's Brief, p. 15).

Furthermore, the State has failed to refute the contention of the
defendant that in cases where a defendant fails to acknowledge a
memory of the facts giving rise to the crime that the court must
satisfy itself that sufficient evidence exists independent of the
defendant's plea.

Here, the court made no effort to examine the

underlying facts even though the court was aware that the
defendant maintained he had no memory of any wrongdoing.
The second argument raised by the defendant concerning his
ability to understand the plea agreement has also not been refuted
by the State.

Instead, the State has merely quoted the same

language already quoted by the defendant in his brief in which
counsel for the State indicated that Defendant was going to have
to "acknowledge responsibility" and where the lower court informs
him that the programs may not take him if he "claims factually
that you did not do what you are charged with." (Appellee's Brief,
pp. 13-14).

Again, however, there is no evidence that anyone

informed the defendant of the extensive requirements of the
various programs that Defendant actually remember what occurred
and that he actually believe in his own guilt.

The mere

acknowledging responsibility or in agreeing factually that he must
-13-

have committed a crime was clearly not sufficient to keep the
defendant in the therapy programs.
Defendant believes that he has painstakingly outlined the
legal requirements of a guilty plea in his opening brief and has
specifically addressed the two areas which Defendant believes is
deficient and which require a vacating of the plea.

The State has

simply failed to perform any detailed analysis of these
contentions and has only superficially claimed that the trial
court performed its function in light of Rule 11 and Gibbons.
This is simply not the case however.
For these reasons, therefore, the trial court erred in
failing to set aside Defendant's guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
The State has attempted to escape the merits of this case by
arguing that Defendant is precluded from attempting to vacate his
plea because of a statute which was passed some two years after
his plea and which automatically would preclude him from ever
being able to attack his plea in a direct appeal.

Constitutional

protection as well as common sense precludes the State from
prevailing in this argument.

Furthermore, to require the

defendant to now initiate a habeas corpus action is equally
without merit since the State would no doubt argue that that
action is also precluded by a statute of limitation.

The

defendant has been incarcerated long enough and is entitled to
have this matter adjudicated before his sentence expires or he is
naturally parolled.
The State has failed to refute the contentions of the
-14-

defendant that the lower court did not comply with the Gibbons
requirements as to the factual basis of the elements of the
defendant's crime or as to his understanding of the plea
agreement.

Either or both of these elements is fatal to the

validity of a no contest plea.
For these reasons, therefore, the no contest plea of the
defendant should be vacated and this matter remanded to the lower
court for further disposition.
Respectfully submitted,

Craig S. Cook
Attorney for Appellant
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